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This paper attempts to analyze the impact of board structure attributes
on their accounting and stock market performance. Our analyses are
built on an emerging market, Turkey for the period between 1995 and
2006. We conduct our analyses through binary logistic methodology.
Our findings show that, while board ownership does not have any im-
pact on the accounting performance, it has a fairly positive influence on
the stock market performance of firms during the crisis period. Simi-
larly, the situation when the ceo of a firm is also the chairman of the
board is not found to have any impact on the corporate performance
of firms, although its negative impact is present during the crisis pe-
riod. Moreover, board independence is found to not to have an eﬀect
on accounting performance, yet the stock market perceives board inde-
pendence positively, both in general and in the crisis periods. Finally,
board size has a positive impact , both on the accounting and on the
stock market performance of firms, yet the impact on the corporate
performance reverts to adverse during the crisis period.
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Introduction
The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board
attributes on corporate performance in an emerging market, Turkey.
Therefore we examine whether a significant diﬀerence exists between
board size, board independence, board ownership and their accounting
and stock market valuation performance measures, specifically return
on assets (roa), and Tobin’s Q.
This study contributes to the limited existing body of literature re-
garding the emerging markets from various aspects. First, it provides ad-
ditional evidence for determination of the direction of the relationship
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between board structure and firm performance in an emerging mar-
ket context. Due to the limited number of studies in this field and the
contradictory results obtained, there is still not a consensus on whether
board structure improves firm performance in emerging markets. More-
over, most empirical research studying the relationship between board
structure and corporate performance uses data from the us or other de-
veloped economies and provides mixed results.¹ However, the ability to
generalize these results regarding the board structure-performance rela-
tionship may not extend across national boundaries. While the assump-
tion of a utility maximizing agent is universal, each country’s regulatory
and economic environment, the strength of capital markets, and cur-
rent governance practices are diﬀerent. As a result, the importance and
value of various governance structures should be separately examined in
each country. Furthermore, this study presents evidence from an emerg-
ing market and a civil law country which possesses relatively diﬀerent
characteristics to those of the common law and developed countries that
have been extensively studied by the majority of the existing studies in
the corporate governance literature.
There have only been a few studies addressing Turkey related with this
topic. As compared with the contents of previous studies, this study is
the most detailed one that is directed towards examing the performance
eﬀects of board structure in Turkey. Moreover, having elaborated an
emerging market, one must also take into consideration the fluctuations
in the market. Therefore we also study the role of the board attributes
during the economic constriction periods in Turkey.
We study the period between 1995 and 2006 on a total of 999 firm
level observations and we conduct our analyses through logistic regres-
sions. Despite the finding of Selekler-Goksen and Karatas (2008) that
board structure does not have a significant impact on performance, our
in–depth analyses goes beyond this finding. Firstly, our findings indicate
that while board ownership does not have any impact on the accounting
performance, it has a fairly positive influence on the stock market per-
formance of firms during the crisis period. Similarly, the situation when
the ceo of a firm is also the chairman of the board is not found to have
any influence on corporate performance of firms, however its negative
impact is observed only during the crisis period. Moreover, board inde-
pendence is found not to have an aﬀect on accounting performance, yet
the stock market perceives board independence positively, not only in
general but also during the crisis periods. Finally, our most interesting
Managing Global Transitions
Board Structure and Corporate Performance 5
results are related to the board size. Generally, board size has a positive
impact on both the accounting and the stock market performance of
firms. Nevertheless, the impact of board size on the corporate perfor-
mance reverts to adverse during the crisis period.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews
the related literature and builds hypotheses. Section three explains briefly
the data and methodology, and section four reports the results of the
analyses of performance measures for the each of the attributes of the
board structure. Finally, section five concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The finance literature covers a vast array of research concerning the rela-
tionship between board structure and firm performance. In other words,
the main two tasks of the board are advising and monitoring the ac-
tivities of management. The better these activities are accomplished the
more improvement in corporate performance will be achieved. There-
fore this section summarizes the literature and builds the hypotheses.
This paper centers on the departure from a basic model of the owner-
manager firm and approach to the separation of ownership from con-
trol. In this paper we concentrate on the concept which leads to the
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The information advan-
tage of controller over owners creates potential for opportunistic behav-
ior. Therefore, we hypothesize that, as the ownership level of boardmem-
bers increases, the corporate performance of firms rises in turn, owing to
diminished agency problem. At first, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)
find no robust link between the amount of equity owned by members
of the board and firm value. However, through using accounting data,
Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) show a significant correlation between
stock owned by outside directors and company performance. Moreover,
Bagnani et al (1994) report a positive relationship between bond returns
and the ownership level, whereas Guest, Gosh, Hughes (2006) find in
uk firms that board ownership has a strong positive impact on long run
share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. Fi-
nally Coles, Lemmon and Wang (2008) concludes that ownership does
not have any explanatory power on the firm performance measured by
Tobin’s Q.
Chairs are special board members who have the job of overseeing the
entire board’s activity. However when a manager of a firm is also chair-
man of the board in the same firm, then the board is not assumed to
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be independent in monitoring and advising activities, because the ob-
jectivity in judgment of the performance of the company is likely to be
impaired. When the board is independent it can serve as a balance to tip
the scales in favor of better corporate performance. Rosenstein and Wy-
att (1997) find that independent directors cause stock market investors to
give a positive response and increase the market value of the firm. West-
phal (1999) emphasizes that ceo’s intervention on the board, or even
taking up the chairman position, may end up in diminished involvement
and eﬀectiveness of board members by reducing their tendency to con-
trol management decisionmaking. Finally, Millstein andMacavoy (1998)
find a significant correlation between board independence and superior
economic profit.
As for Turkey, Küçükçolak and Özer (2007) show that 10.4 percent
of all the ise members have separated the responsibilities of ceo and
chairman. Furthermore, Kula (2005) studies mostly small and non-listed
companies in Turkey and finds that separation of chairman and gen-
eral manager positions has a significant positive eﬀect on firm perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, through studying both accounting and stock mar-
ket data, Bhagat and Black (1999) do not obtain evidence that greater in-
dependence results from higher performance. In accord with this, Nickell
(1995) states that non-executive directors may not have adequate incen-
tives to removemanagers when the stockmarket performance of the firm
declines.
Board size is the most elaborated board structure in the corporate fi-
nance literature, and in general the relationship between board size and
corporate performance is found to be inversely related. Using both To-
bin’s Q and roa as the performance measures, Yermack (1996) confirms
a negative association between board size and firm value because benefits
of monitoring from enlarging boards are outweighed by problems asso-
ciated with the increased asymmetric information and deteriorated com-
munication issues. This result is rooted in the finding of Jensen (1993),
which suggests that there is a likelihood that the gap between owner-
ship and control expands as the boards gets bigger. As the size of boards
increases the percentage of independent directors, who have no or very
low ownership in firm, is expected to increase as well.² A recent study
by Cheng (2008) also concludes that board size has a negative impact on
both the accounting and the stock market performance of the board size.
Finally, Coles, Daniels and Navrees (2008) find that there is a U-shaped
relationship between the firm size and corporate performance.³
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Data andMethodology
This study is built on non-financial firms listed on Istanbul Stock Ex-
change (ise). We have a balanced panel including 999 observations. Our
study period is between the years 1995 and 2006. Therefore we are able to
study the role of the crisis period on the board structure–corporate per-
formance relationship as well. We collect financial data directly from the
ise website (www.imkb.gov.tr), whereas the ownership data are gathered
from the Yearbook of Firms, which is issued annually by the ise.
Our aim is also to investigate how the relationship between board
structure and corporate performance is aﬀected during the crisis years.
Therefore we interact every board attribute with a crisis dummy in the
regressions. Turkey was adversely aﬀected by the Russian debt default in
the year 1998 due to the contagion eﬀect. Moreover Turkey was severely
hit by a domestic financial crisis, which reflected its influence during the
years 2001 and 2002. Therefore the crisis dummy takes the value of unity
if the observation years coincide with the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and
zero otherwise.⁴
We use logistic regression methodology for conducting our analyses.
Our estimation technique allows for a binary dependent variable, which
rules out the usual regression analysis, including the linear probability
model. The probabilities in our model are bounded by zero and unity,
hence linear functions are inappropriate for our models given that they
are inherently unbounded. In specific, our logit model contains a two
state dependent variable, namely: State 1 = High Corporate Performance
and State 0 = Low Corporate Performance. Put diﬀerently, we assume
that the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value of
unity if a firm is reported to have a high corporate performance, and zero
otherwise. A firm is accepted to have a high (low) corporate performance
if the value of its Tobin’sQ (roa) is ranked at the top (bottom) 25 percent
of the sample. We exclude all the observations falling between the top
and bottom quartiles of the sample in order to eliminate the shadow
variables. Finally the total number of observations falling into the top
(bottom) quartile is 500 (499).
A common representation of the logit model used in our estimation is
as follows;
Pit = f (X
i
t−1, Et−1), (1)
where Pit takes the value of 1, if i is found to have a high Tobin’s Q (roa)
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in year t and takes the value of zero if otherwise. Vector Xit−1 represents
board characteristics of the firm. Vector Et−1 represents other attributes
of the firm such as the financial attributes. More explicitly, the probabil-
ity of having a high corporate performance is a random event and un-
known, but can be estimated. The probability of having a high corporate
performance is:
P[Yi = 1] = p0. (2)
Furthermore, the probability of having a low corporate performance
is:
P[Yi = 0] = 1 − p0. (3)
The probabilities are determined by some firm specific variables and
Xi are assumed to come from a logistic distribution function. Then, we
can write the probability of having a high corporate performance as a
function of X as follows:
P[Yi = 1|X] = 1
1 + exp
(∑
j X
i
jβ1
) . (4)
Finally, the probability of having low corporate performance would
be:
P[Yi = 0|X] =
exp
(∑
j X
i
jβ1
)
1 + exp
(∑
j X
i
jβ1
) . (5)
We concentrate on the odds ratios while interpreting the regression
results. The coeﬃcients of the model are estimated by the maximum
likelihood method. Furthermore, we include the following control vari-
ables into themodel; age , size, debt maturity structure, leverage and cash
holding behavior of the firm.
Results
As seen from table 1, our first results provide the descriptive statistics on
the variables. The average board ownership is found to be only 9.6 per-
cent. Moreover, the average of persons on the board is 5.7. Chairman is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the manager of the firm is also
the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Our results show that in
most firms managers do not simultaneously work as a chairman on the
board. Board Independ. represents board independency and is a dummy
Managing Global Transitions
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table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Board Own. 9.601 0.120 17.494 0.000 83.320
Board Size 5.708 6 28.810 2 45
Chairman 0.085 0 0.279 0 1
Board Independ. 0.400 0 0.490 0 1
Age 26.692 29 13.087 1 95
Size 17.556 17.575 1.904 0 22.885
Debt Maturity 0.746 0.788 0.183 0 1
Leverage 0.478 0.479 0.211 0 0.984
Cash 0.070 0.029 0.097 0.000 0.850
mv/bv 2.292 1.657 2.116 0.000 14.585
roa 0.057 0.051 0.120 –1.253 0.854
notes This table presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Board Own. rep-
resents total ownership percentages of the board members in the firm. Board Size is the
total number of members on the board. Chairman is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if the manger of the firm is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Board
Independ. represents board independence and is a dummy variable taking the value of 1
if the manager is also a board member, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years
a firm has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Debt Maturity is
the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. mv/bv is calculated as
[(Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)]/Book Value of
Assets. Finally, Return on Assets (roa) is estimated as net profits scaled by total assets.
variable taking the value of 1 if the manager is also a board member, and
zero otherwise. On average, managers are not found to be a member on
boards, since the average value of the dummy variable is 0.4. Generally,
firms in our sample are found to be young yet large in size. Firms on
average hold short maturity of debt and have a fair leverage yet low cash
holdings. Finally, firms in the sample have on average high growth op-
portunities and a positive return on assets.
Table 2 presents the Pearson Correlation matrix across the variables.
We are assured that we have no threat of multicollinearity since the cor-
relation coeﬀcient does not exceed 0.50 for any of our variables.
board ownership
We firstly look at the association between ownership levels of board
members and the stock market performance of firms. Table 3 demon-
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table 3 Board Ownership and the Stock Market Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 3.205 0.868 13.653 0.000
Board Own. 0.006 0.005 1.429 0.232 0.994
Board Own.*Crisis 0.022 0.009 6.481 0.011 0.979
Age 0.022 0.006 15.514 0.000 1.023
Size –0.355 0.045 62.652 0.000 0.701
Cash 5.139 0.868 35.072 0.000 170.579
Maturity 0.322 0.398 0.655 0.418 1.380
Leverage 4.021 0.366 120.886 0.000 55.783
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.204 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.273 n/a
–2log likelihood 1156.46 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is mv/bv, which is calculated as [(Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity +
Market Value of Equity)]/Book Value of Assets. The independent variable is a binary one
which takes the value of 1 if the mv/bv of that company is situated at the top 25 percent
of the sample and zero if it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board
Own. represnts total ownership percentages of the board members in the firm. Board
Own.*Crisis is an interaction between Board Own. and the crisis years.Crisis is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1if the observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002 and
zero otherwise. Age is the number of years a firm has been operating. Size is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Debt Mat. is the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities
to total assets.
strates the regression results, where our dependent variable is the dummy
variable which takes the value of unity (zero) if the value of Tobin’s Q of
the firm is situated at the top (bottom) quartile of the sample.
In general, board ownership is not found to have any influence on the
stock market performance of firms. However, we see that board own-
ership has a positive influence during the crisis period. Specifically, a 1
percent increase in the ownership level of board members is likely to
have a 21 percent increase in the stock market performance of that firm.
We conclude that investors opt for the firms having owner members on
boards during the economic constriction periods.
When the control variables in the regression are examined, it is firstly
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12 Özgür Arslan, Mehmet Baha Karan, and Cihan Eks¸i
table 4 Board Ownership and the Accounting Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 3.977 0.856 21.607 0.000
Board Own. 0.007 0.005 2.153 0.142 0.993
Board Own.*Crisis 0.005 0.009 0.304 0.995 0.978
Age 0.005 0.005 0.684 0.408 1.005
Size –0.216 0.042 26.602 0.000 0.806
Cash 8.004 1.062 56.797 0.000 2993.418
Maturity 1.300 0.424 9.400 0.002 3.668
Leverage –3.871 0.373 107.923 0.000 0.000
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.271 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.362 n/a
–2log likelihood 1069.857 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is roa, which is defined as the return on assets and estimated as net profits
scaled by total assets. The independent variable is a binary, one which takes the value of
1 if the roa of that company is situated at the top 25 percent of the sample, and zero if
it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board Own. represents total owner-
ship percentages of the board members in the firm. Board Own.*Crisis is an interaction
between Board Own. and the crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable taking the value of
1 if the observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the
number of years a firm has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Debt Mat. is the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt
to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
seen that, firm age is found to be positively related to Tobin’s Q, whereas
firm size is associated with a low stock market performance. As con-
firmed by the finding of Arslan, Florackis, and Ozkan (2006) firms with
high growth opportunities are found here to hoard a high level of cash.
However, despite the highlighted reasoning of a negative association be-
tween long term debt and growth opportunities by Myers (1977), we do
not find any significant relationship between the variables in this regres-
sion.
Our next set of results as presented in table 4 reveals the relationship
between the board ownership and the accounting performance of a firm.
Here dependent variable is the dummy variable which takes the value of
unity (zero) if the value of the roa of the firm is situated at the top
Managing Global Transitions
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(bottom) quartile of the sample. Interestingly, we find no relationship
between board ownership and the roa of firms. Even the interaction
with the crisis period yields an insignificant relationship. Therefore we
conclude that ownership of board members does not play a significant
role in reducing agency costs and asymmetric information problems in
firms.
Regarding the results on the control variables, firm age is not found to
have a significant impact on the accounting performance of firms. Firm
size has a negative impact on the accounting performance since a one
percent increase in firm size reduces the roa by almost 20 percent. Prof-
itable firms are likely to have a higher level of cash flow, and the posi-
tive and significant coeﬃcient of the cash–holding variable confirms our
reasoning. Profitable firms are found to hold a higher level of short term
debt relative to the long term debt. Finally leverage and profitability are
found to be negatively related. This finding confirms the pecking order
theory ofMyers andMajluf (1984) in the sense that profitable firms firstly
resort to their internal funds for financing.
manager as a chairman of the board
Here we investigate the situation when a ceo of a firm also acts as chair-
man of the board. Table 5 provides the results on the relationship of the
separation between the manger and chairman positions in a firm and its
stock market performance.
The separation is not found to have any impact on the stock market
performance of firms. However the interaction with the crisis dummy
shows us that the market perceives the situation when such a separation
is not fulfilled in a firm as being a bad signal during the crisis period.
Therefore, a one percent increase in the occurrence of an event of non-
separation of a managerial and a chairman position in a firm is likely to
decrease its stock market performance by 66 percent. The results on the
relationship between the control variables and the stock market perfor-
mance go hand in hand with those reported in table 3.
When we move to the impact of the degree of separation between the
manager and chairman roles on the accounting performance of firms,
we regard the results reported in table 6.
Interestingly we can not find a statistically significant relationship be-
tween theChairman dummy and the accounting performance, neither in
general nor specifically in the crisis period. Therefore we conclude that
the non-separation between the ceo and chairman positions in a firm is
Volume 8 · Number 1 · Spring 2010
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table 5 Manager as the Chairman of the Board and the stock market performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 2.698 0.883 9.323 0.002
Chairman 0.112 0.286 0.152 0.697 1.118
Chairman*Crisis –1.070 0.532 4.039 0.044 0.343
Age 0.024 0.006 18.663 0.000 1.025
Size –0.339 0.044 58.884 0.000 0.713
Cash 5.242 0.872 36.173 0.000 188.965
Maturity 0.307 0.396 0.598 0.439 1.359
Leverage 3.991 0.363 120.711 0.000 54.128
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.199 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.265 n/a
–2log likelihood 1163.62 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is mv/bv, which is calculated as [(Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity +
Market Value of Equity)]/Book Value of Assets. The independent variable is a binary one,
which takes the value of 1 if the mv/bv of that company is situated at the top 25 percent
of the sample, and zero if it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Chairman
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if manager of the firm is also the chairman
of the board, and zero otherwise. Chairman*Crisis is an interaction between Chairman
and the crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is
at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years a firm
has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Debt Mat. is the ratio of
short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the
ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
not found to be as hazardous as expected for the accounting performance
of firms. In other words, managers, who also hold chairman position in
a firm, are not likely to transfer wealth to their benefit at the expense of
the shareholders. The results on the control variables align with those
reported in table 4.
board independence
Table 7 presents the results of the estimation for a possible relationship
between board independence and the stock market performance. Here,
we are only interested in the situation in which a manager is only a mem-
ber of the board, not a chairman. Therefore the results in this section are
diﬀerent in interpretation to those reported in the previous section.
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table 6 Manager as the Chairman of the Board and the accounting performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 3.871 0.852 20.633 0.000
Chairman –0.082 0.305 0.073 0.787 0.921
Chairman*Crisis –0.329 0.578 0.325 0.569 0.720
Age 0.006 0.005 1.414 0.234 1.006
Size –0.217 0.042 26.966 0.000 0.805
Cash 7.989 1.064 56.392 0.000 2948.91
Maturity 1.307 0.424 9.492 0.002 3.695
Leverage –3.865 0.372 107.832 0.000 0.000
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.269 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.359 n/a
–2log likelihood 1073.015 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is roa, which is defined as the return on assets and estimated as net profits
scaled by total assets. The independent variable is a binary one, which takes the value of
1 if the roa of that company is situated at the top 25 percent of the sample, and zero if it
is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Chairman is a dummy variable, taking
the value of 1 if manager of the firm is also the chairman of the board and zero other-
wise. Chairman*Crisis is an interaction between Chairman and the crisis years. Crisis is
a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and
2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years a firm has been operating. Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets. Debt Mat. is the ratio of short term debt to total debt.
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable
securities to total assets.
Our results show that board independence is negatively related with
Tobin’sQ of a firm. A 1 percent increase in the board independence is ex-
pected to decrease the stock market performance by almost 74 percent.
Similarly, board independence is also perceived as a bad signal during
the crisis period. Observing a 1 percent increase in the board indepen-
dence is likely to decrease the stock market performance by almost 63
percent. The results concerning the control variables are in accord with
those previously reported.
Our next results are reported in table 7 and they demonstate the direc-
tion of the association between board independency and the accounting
performance. We find no statistically significant role of board indepen-
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table 7 Board Independence and the Stock Market Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 2.800 0.882 10.021 0.002
Board Independ. –1.334 0.468 8.145 0.004 0.263
Board Independ.*Crisis –0.976 0.268 13.260 0.000 0.377
Age 0.024 0.006 18.210 0.000 1.025
Size –0.342 0.045 57.878 0.000 0.710
Cash 5.625 0.873 41.504 0.000 277.298
Maturity 0.268 0.401 0.508 0.476 1.331
Leverage 4.281 0.377 129.151 0.000 72.322
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.212 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.283 n/a
–2log likelihood 1146.68 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is mv/bv, which is calculated as [(Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity +
Market Value of Equity)]/Book Value of Assets. The independent variable is a binary one,
which takes the value of 1 if the mv/bv of that company is situated at the top 25 percent
of the sample, and zero if it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board
Independ. represents board independence and is a dummy variable taking the value of
1 if the manager is also a board member, and zero otherwise. Board Independ.*Crisis is
an interaction between Board Independ. and the crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if the observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero other-
wise. Age is the number of years a firm has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm
of total assets. Debt Mat. is the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio
of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total
assets.
dence in the accounting performance of firms, not only in general but
also within its interaction with the crisis period. Furthermore, the con-
trol variables are identical in sign and significance with the previous find-
ings.
We conclude that board independence has an adverse impact on cor-
porate performance in general. It is likely that independent board mem-
bers in Turkish firms do not have suﬃcient incentives to monitor man-
agement, due to the following reasons. First of all, the executive and non-
executive split may be non-artificial for Turkish firms. In other words,
the benefits of board members may be informally parallel to those of the
managers in expense at the shareholders. Furthermore, there may be an
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table 8 Board Independence and the Accounting Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 3.979 0.860 21.386 0.000
Chairman –0.156 0.166 0.887 0.346 0.856
Chairman*Crisis –0.098 0.272 0.130 0.718 0.907
Age 0.007 0.005 1.509 0.219 1.007
Size –0.220 0.042 27.518 0.000 0.802
Cash 7.929 1.062 55.754 0.000 2777.879
Maturity 1.314 0.424 9.594 0.002 3.720
Leverage –3.880 0.374 107.845 0.000 0.000
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.270 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.359 n/a
–2log likelihood 1072.218 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is roa, which is defined as the return on assets and estimated as net profits
scaled by total assets. The independent variable is a binary one, which takes the value
of 1 if the roa of that company is situated at the top 25 percent of the sample, and
zero if it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board Independ. represents
board independence and is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the manager is also
a board member, and zero otherwise. Board Independ.*Crisis is an interaction between
Board Independ and the crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of
years a firm has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Debt Mat. is
the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
asymmetry of information between non-executive and executive mem-
bers on a board. Therefore, the quality of financial or strategic informa-
tion divulged to non-executive members by the executive ones may be
poor.
board size
Table 9 presents results on the relationship between board size and firm
performance. In contrast to to the general findings in the literature,
board size is found to have a positive impact on the stock market per-
formance of firms. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the size of a board
is likely to increase the stock market performance of firms by 1.3 times.
However board size is found to be negatively aﬀecting the stock market
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table 9 Board Size and the Stock Market Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 2.270 0.889 6.524 0.011
Board Size 0.295 0.046 40.327 0.000 1.343
Board Size*Crisis –0.159 0.027 34.646 0.000 0.853
Age 0.017 0.006 8.458 0.004 1.017
Size –0.413 0.048 73.179 0.000 0.661
Cash 5.622 0.887 40.174 0.000 276.503
Maturity 0.330 0.406 0.674 0.412 1.395
Leverage 4.749 0.397 143.313 0.000 115.493
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.246 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.328 n/a
–2log likelihood 1102.61 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is mv/bv, which is calculated as [(Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity +
Market Value of Equity)]/Book Value of Assets. The independent variable is a binary one,
which takes the value of 1 if the mv/bv of that company is situated at the top 25 percent of
the sample, and zero if it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board Size is
the total number of members on the board. Board Size*Crisis is an interaction between
Board Size and the crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the
observation is at the years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of
years a firm has been operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Debt Mat. is
the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets.
performance during the crisis period. A 1 percent increase in the board
independence is likely to decrease the stock market performance by al-
most 15 percent. Control variables have similar sign and significance lev-
els to those of the previous findings.
Results in table 10 show the relationship between board independence
and the accounting performance. Similar to the previous findings, board
size increases the accounting performance of firms. A 1 percent increase
in the size of the board increases the accounting performance by almost
1.08 percent. In a similar fashion, board size has a negative influence on
the roa of firms. A 1 unit increase in the board size decreases the ac-
counting performance of firms by almost 5 units. The significance and
signs of the control variables align with those of the previous findings.
We derive from these results that board size has a generally positive
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table 10 Board Size and the Accounting Performance
Variables Coeﬃcient Std. Error Wald p-value Odds
Intercept 3.536 0.881 16.103 0.000
Board Size 0.080 0.044 3.308 0.069 1.084
Board Size*Crisis –0.049 0.027 3.302 0.069 0.952
Age 0.003 0.006 0.356 0.551 1.003
Size –0.220 0.042 27.335 0.000 0.803
Cash 8.033 1.070 56.378 0.000 3081.806
Maturity 1.276 0.425 9.024 0.003 1.558
Leverage –3.801 0.373 103.736 0.000 0.000
Goodness of fit tests Value p-value
Cox and Snell – R2 0.273 n/a
Nagelkerke – R2 0.364 n/a
–2log likelihood 1067.856 0.000
No. of observations 999
notes This table presents the results of the logistic regression, while the independent
variable is roa, which is defined as the return on assets and estimated as net profits
scaled by total assets. The independent variable is a binary one, which takes the value of
1 if the roa of that company is situated at the top 25 percent of the sample, and zero if
it is situated at the bottom 25 percent of the sample. Board Size is the total number of
members on the board. Board Size*Crisis is an interaction between Board Size and the
crisis years. Crisis is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the observation is at the
years 1998, 2001 and 2002, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years a firm has been
operating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.Debt Mat. is the ratio of short term
debt to total debt. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of
cash and marketable securities to total assets.
eﬀect on the corporate performance through increasing eﬀectiveness in
advising the decision-making in a firm through the diversified experi-
ence and know-how of the various members. Similarly, the marginal
costs of monitoring the managerial activity are observed to be decreasing
as the board size increases. However the situation reverts during the crisis
period, and board size becomes disadvantageous for the corporate per-
formance of firms. It is likely that communication problems arise during
the economic downturn times, hence the costs of the board size then
outweigh its benefits.
Conclusion
The impact of the attributes of the board structure is not elaborated in
detail in the corporate finance literature from an emerging market per-
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spective. Therefore, this study shows the relationship between the cor-
porate performance, namely the accounting and the stock market per-
formance, and the board independence, separation of the tasks of man-
agement and chairman, board ownership and the board size. We build
our analyses on the a total of 999 observations of Turkish non-financial
listed firms for the period between 1995 and 2006. We conduct our anal-
yses through logistic methodology by eliminating the shadow variables.
We also study how the relationship is aﬀected during the crisis periods.
Our findings indicate that, while board ownership does not have any
impact on the accounting performance, it has a fairly positive influence
on the stock market performance of firms during the crisis period. Sim-
ilarly, the situation when the ceo of a firm is also the chairman of the
board is not found to have any impact on the corporate performance of
firms, although its negative impact is observed during the crisis period.
Moreover, board independence is found not to have aﬀect on accounting
performance, yet the stock market perceives board independence pos-
itively both in general and in the crisis periods. Finally, our most in-
teresting results are related to the board size. Generally, board size has
a positive impact on both the accounting and the stock market perfor-
mance of firms. Nevertheless, the impact of board size on the corporate
performance reverts to adverse during the crisis period.
Notes
1 See among others Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber
1996; Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994.
2 In accord with this, Bhagat and Black (1996) find that the median owner-
ship percentage of independent directors is 1 percent.
3 Following this finding we have checked the Turkish data, however our re-
sults do not confirm a noneconomic U-shape relationship between board
size and both roa and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, in our analyses, we assume
that the association is linear.
4 We also take the 1997 Asian crises into account, however the contagion
eﬀect of this incidence was midly felt in Turkey. Besides, our results do not
change when we include the years 1997 as a unity dummy in our analyses.
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